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The aims of this paper are to delineate some important topics in landscape economics, and also to put 
landscape policy in the perspective of the sustainable development.  The research issue is about the 
relationships between the development paths and landscape changes, paved with examples of   
consensus, controversies, and conflicts. 
Landscape is a polysemic term, many approaches and definitions exist for it, and as a consequence, 
economists should adopt or elaborate their own landscape definition or concept (the most suitable to 
their general methodology, and related to their most familiar concepts ). 
Landscape appears to be a local public good. That definition correspond to the property rights market 
failure arising from the co-visibility. Co-visibility makes it difficult in general to identify precisely the 
link between each owner action and the agregate landscape outcome. As a consequence, landscape 
ownership appears to be scattered into a multiplicity of actors of various nature (individual, 
communal, statal…). How to exploit that analogy with non point source pollution is a challenge for 
landscape economics research. Each actor has his own objective and management criteria, either for 
agricultural, forestry, industrial or residential activities. Moreover, there are multiple public policies 
aimed at sustaining each activity. Inevitably, public policies failures arise, and so the need for 
coordination actions aimed at landscape maintenance and preservation. Because the local public good 
nature of the landscape, it’s worth to look at the models of public good joint production. How to 
agregate actions from different land owners into a resulting landscape, or how to coordinate actions 
scattered among multiple landowners  in order to get a specific desired outcome is a real challenge ? In 
some case, the responsability of changes is concentrated in the hand of few decision makers, in some 
others, the responsability is more diffuse, and the non point production function of the landscape could 
be approximated by an additive function. The issue of the agregation of actions is closely related to the 
one of preferences heterogeneity and agregation. Because a specific landscape project could be 
appreciated as beneficial or detrimental by different people,  it’s necessary to separate the stage of 
evaluation, the stage of decision making and the stage of implementation. Issues of coordination of 
actions arising at the implementation stage should take for granted the landscape objectives  and the 
social value of the project. Eventually, the design of Institutional arrangements to manage landscape 
should take onto account his nature of common pool resource. 
The paper is organized  so as to take stock from the contributions of the research community in 
Landscape economics, and also to signal some missing links and promising  paths.  Naturally, our 
paper does not exhaust  all the topics, we will concentrate on three topics : preferences definition and 
evaluation, joint production, and governance.  
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The aims of this paper are to delineate some important topics in landscape economics, and to 
put landscape policy in the perspective of the sustainable development. This perspective is 
challenging for economists, due to the two gaps observed between the development of 
landscape research in geography, ecology or sociology and the absence of a corresponding 
corpus in economics, on one hand, and the development of landscape policies compared to the 
development of research in economics, on the other one. Indeed, developping landscape 
economics is a scientific challenge of its own right, because landscape changes arise from the 
interaction between technological drivers and social preferences. Moreover, due to the 
importance of landscapes and their diversity for the tourism industry and the well-being of the 
population, the research on landscape policy is socially desirable. 
Landscape is a polysemic term, many approaches and definitions exist for it (Cosgrove, 1984) 
and as a consequence, economists should adopt or elaborate their own landscape definition  
(the most suitable to their general methodology, and related to their most familiar concepts ). 
The definition given by the European Landscape Convention
2 appears to be suitable for most 
economists, because it is streamlined with the methodological individualism they used to rely 
on. Economists think individual as having landscape preferences, and as a consequence, 
landscape preferences could be diverse, and their distribution in a society facing landscape 
changes, heterogenous. Landscape changes often concentrate unresolved social issues, and the 
road for the research is paved with examples of  controversies, conflicts and consensus as 
well. 
Price and al. presented a paper (Price, 2009) on a specific place of landscape economics  
inside economics and alongside others fields of economics (spatial economics, environmental 
and resources economics, public economics…). The case for landscape economics’ autonomy 
rely on the importance of cultural and aesthetics amenities and services produced by   
landscape and their diversity. They asserted  that « In many ways, landscape is a social, 
cultural and economic construction », and, as a consequence, they place elicitation of social 
and individual landscape values  at a first place amid the topics to be investigated. Because 
evaluation is mainly concerned by landscape changes, landscape  economists  face the 
specific issue of the transformation and evolution of norms and preferences. «  The adoption 
of major changes  in landscape or architectural  items by citizens echoes the diffusion of other 
innovations ». Moreover, preferences’ elicitation and project management should take into 
account the very dynamic process of preferences updating.  
Due to the nature of the landscape as local public good, and because landscape changes are 
driven by individual and collective decisions, landscape governance, though necessary, 
appears to be very complex and even in some circumstances, controversial or conflictual.  
Economist could help in analyzing and looking at procedures and institutional arrangements 
most suited to manage and organize it.  
In order to give policy makers or politicians some relevant guidance in coping with landscape 
changes, economists should also help to understand mechanisms of landscape 
transformations. The understanding of the landscape making up (as cultural and aesthetical 
services) should rely on the understanding of the patterns and process at stake, arising from 
                                                 
2  « Paysage » désigne une partie de territoire telle que perçue par les populations, dont le 
caractère résulte de l’action de facteurs naturels et/ou humains et de leurs interrelations » 
Convention européenne du paysage, www.coe.int/conventioneuropeennedu paysage spatial economics and economic geography, but it should also rely on the understanding of 
landscape innovations and emergence, and on their interactions with changes in preferences. 
That is a strong argument in favor of the landscape economics autonomy. 
In this paper, I will  not deal with all the issues relevant for the developement of landscape 
economics. I will instead concentrate on three topics  only: Preferences formation and 
evaluation, joint production,  governance and policy design.  
 
I. Evaluation of landscape changes  
 
1.1 Valuation approaches 
 
We first describe the most popular methods and the theoretical basis they are grounded on, 
and examine the limitations they face in regard of the process of landscape perception. As we 
mentioned above, landscape should be considered together as a public good, and as an 
external effect of scattered decisions of land use emanating from a variety of landowners. As 
a consequence, evaluating the impact of landscape changes on the social welfare could not 
rely on usual measures of welfare using market prices. In that context, economists have two 
main approaches in their toolbox. 
By observing the behaviour of inhabitants or tourists on markets exhibiting a (weak) 
complementarity with landscape, they could try to estimate the willingness to pay for some 
landscape attributes or changes. This revealed preferences approach uses data collected on 
transport and accomodation expenses, or on housing market (Cavailhes, 2008) . The 
shortcomings of the method are lying precisely on two main characteristics : the first is about 
the intensity of the complementarity between landscape attributes and the indicating market, 
the second is about the cost of performing marginal analysis of the impact of attributes  values 
on the prices observed on the indicating market. For that resaon, revealed preferences 
approaches are  challenged by stated preferences approach. 
Stated preferences are based upon the construction of virtual market, offering to the inhabitant 
or to the tourist choices among scenarios or choice sets, and balancing them by a monetary 
attribute. The aim of landscape evaluation is to give monetary value to landscape changes, not 
to the landscape portfolio as a whole. Because they intend to build a virtual market for 
landscape changes, stated preferences methods face criticism for their potential 
constructivism : they are shedding light only on the changes chosen by the designer of the 
survey, and encompass potential biases.  
Stated preferences methods are now widely used in landscape changes evaluation (Santos, 
1998, Bonnieux, 1997, Idda, 2005, Rambonilaza, 2004). Due to some criticism and 
limitations brought about  contingent valuation (Noublanche, 1999,  Willinger, 1996), but also 
due to the ability of choice experiment methods to deal with complementarity and 
subsituability issues, one could observe a switch from CV to CE during the last decade. 
Stated preferences methods are mainly based on the MAUT (Multi Attributes Utility Theory), 
and rely on analytical characterization of landscape changes. Because stated preferences are 
usually performed in an local context, the global characterization of landscape remains 
implicit. It is then possible to proceed in decomposing a specific landscape unit into his 
components or attributes.  And to measure the complementarity or the substituability between 
those components.  
Based on the seminal paper by Hoehn (Hoehn, 1991), Santos pointed out two main issues 
arising in landscape evaluation, and involving complementarity and substituability (Santos, 
1998). The first is a multi-site problem, the second is a multi-attribute one-site problem. The multi-site problem raises the issue of the structure of the landscape portfolio. The preference 
for a diversified landscape portfolio implies a degree of complementarity between sites, while 
a high degree of substituability among sites implies a landscape portfolio having a low 
diversification. Obviously, the multi-sites problem relies on some degree on the ability of 
people to discriminate sites as similar or different, with regard to some attributes relevant for 
preferences. During the one-site evaluation process, interactions among attributes impact 
heavily on the outcome. If interactions are not taken onto account by the evaluation 
procedure, this lead to bias the benefit estimate. Interactions in evaluation could encompass 
both structural features (for instance hedgerow, stoneswall and meadows in the socalled 
«  bocage  ») and  functionnal or management features  (the share of openwater and the 
seasonnal water management, or the way of controling mosquitos in the case of wetlands). 
Complementarity and substituability among attributes or landscape components are certainly 
useful dimensions of landscape evaluation, but they are not the only one. 
 
 1.3 Holistic  versus Analytic Approaches  
While the MAUT and the related evaluation methods are largely used in landscape evaluation, 
it’s worth to raise the question of the relevance of such an approach for revealing the 
preferences without bias. If preferences are based on perceptions, and perceptions are holistic 
rather than analytic, one could ask wether our evaluation methodology are suitable and 
efficient. It could then be worth to look at another type of preferences.  
In a literature review published in 1982, Zube and al., provided a general, transactionnist 
framework « in which landscape perception is considered as a function of the interaction of 
humans and landscape  » (Zube, 1982). «  The human component encompasses past 
experience, knowledge, expectations and the socio-cultural context of individuals and groups. 
The landscape components include both individual elements and landscapes as entities. The 
interaction results in outcomes which in turn affect both the human and the landscape 
components » (Zube and al, 1982).  In conclusion of their review, the authors stressed the fact 
that research in landscape had the tendency « to focus on elements (elements of the human 
components of the landscape) rather than on the perceptual interaction . This « elemental » 
focus leads to descriptive research, concentrating on the « what » of landscape perception 
rather than on the « how » or « why » . « Investigation of the connections and relationships 
between and among elements already found to be important in previous research…is an 
important step towards understanding interactions and towards developing a theory of 
landscape perception ». 
« It’s not clear wether individuals actually do distinguish between individual features accross 
the landscape, or wether it is the interaction of the features accross the landscape of a 
particular area which influences the intensity of an individual preferences. Indeed, both 
Appleton (1994) and Brahm (1996) speculate that it is the totality of the landscape and not 
just the individual features within it that leads to positive preferences ». 
Litton (Litton et al., 1974) focused more on landscape patterns and their organization inside 
the framework of « a visual conspicous entity ».  Relying on some case studies from the 
U.S.A. and from Netherland, he stressed the importance and the difficulty of a holistic 
approach, but proposed  a description of landscape units trough the combinaison of land use 
pattern and networks (stream system ). The perceptual framework is generally made from 
three differents units that are in a hierarchical relationship :  the landscape unit, the setting 
unit and the waterscape unit ».  That perceptual organization seems to be related both to the 
cultural and artistic influence of landscape painters, and to the human capacity to distinguish 
units. « The existence of a (three step) hierarchy in dimension and scope of interrelated spaces and 
of interconnected patterns in land use has a strong influence on aesthetic satisfaction ». 
The aesthetic satisfaction could eventually rely on three values : the sense of order (how parts 
fit together), the need to be able to recognize, explain and identify (congruence, transparency, 
legibility), the need for spatial orientation (presence of local and distants landmarks). 
Obviously, landscape perceptions and evaluations should be related to landscape entities.  But 
landscape entities could be defined either by physical boundaries, or by the nature of 
perceptions and the perceived differences among meighbooring entities. Homogenous 
perception in the landscape entitie and heterogenous perception among landscape entities 
create the map of different landscapes.  
Homogeneity of perception is compatible with heterogeneity of composition. For instance, if 
a  landscape is perceived like a chessboard, the perception is homogenous and we talk about a 
mosaic landscape. Take for instance a agricultural landscape made from fields and forested 
area. With the same area of fields and forest spatially arranged in contiguous and compacts 
patches, we will recognize two different landscape entities, one being an open field landscape, 
and the other one being a forested massif. A « forest » or a forested massif, or an open field 
landscape, are homogenous in both dimensions, composition and perception. They are 
saturated by one only element. 
 The fragmentation of both forest and fields, characterize instead the mosaic, and help to 
recognize it as a distinct and homogenous landscape. But in some situations, where the land 
abandonment creates a dynamical process of transition toward the forested state, the 
perception could be more confuse and fading. What does make the difference in perception ? 
 
 1.2 Lexicographic Preferences in landscape evaluation 
 
While performing stated preferences methods, economists often face difficulties in dealing 
with the attitudes and responses of some people, who express disapproval with the principle 
of using the monetary metric in order to put value on nature or landscape or landscape 
projects. Such a situation frequently occurs for projects involving biodiversity, but also 
landscape. For instance, the opponents to the wind power development  could refuse to trade 
off  any attribute related to the wind turbine high, or with the number of turbines. They will 
refuse answering the questionnaire, or  will place protest bids (zero or very high). This type of 
situation, frequently observed in environmental evaluation (some time one out of four 
questionaires) are called lexicographic order or  lexicographic preferences,  due to the analogy 
with the lexicon organization. 
« Decision alternatives are examined initially on the basis of the first, or most important 
criterion. If more than one alternative is « best » or « satisfactory » on this basis, these are 
then compared under the secobnd most important criterion and so forth… » (Fishburn, 1974). 
Thats the so-called principle of order by first difference. Lexicographic preferences are often 
called «  preferences without trade-off  », because they prevents balancing compensation 
between criteria. In particular, no compensation trough monney could be made in that case 
(Rekola, 2003,   Rosenberger, 2003).  
The issue of lexicographic preferences is particularly important in biodiversity evaluation, 
because some people are reluctant to place monney value on nature and life. The same 
difficulties could arise in landscape evaluation, but for different reasons (Shaeffer, 2007).   
In « Landscape economics », C. Price emphasized the complexity of values involved  in the 
interactions between the physical elements of the landscape, on one side, and the nature of 
psychological needs ans desires that may be satisfied by that perceived landscape (Price, 
1978) . Some perceived characteristics could be appraised in reference to social norms (quality, normality, diversity), or to personal experience (peculiarity, familiarity, stability). 
The former could  involve preferences for status quo, while the first could involve or be 
compatible with landscape changes. But if they are not by theirselves opposed to trade-off, 
they could induce protest behavior and objections to put monetary value on some landscape or 
sites.  
Consider now a consumer facing the choice of the next holiday destination. He could use a 
list of  place of destination (Paris, Sydney, New York, The Great reef Barrier, The Great 
Colorado’s Canyon …) or select the place trough a hierarchy of criteria, like Urban/Rural, 
Mountain/Littoral, Desert/Countryside, Forest/ Savanah …The choice clearly involves 
hierarchy of criteria, and rely on the destinations’ portfolio  and on  landscape diversity.  
We then could suppose that choices among destinations involves often lexicographic 
preferences, while choices inside landscape types, involves continuous preferences and 
enables trade-off among landscape attributes (Fleicher, 2009).  
 
1.4 New developments in landscape evaluation 
As economists, we are used to assume that people have stable preferences, because they are 
sovereign, fully informed and rational agents. If we could accept that model as a benchmark 
in some area of economics, it’s certainly more difficult to accept it to investigate domains or 
times of great social and environmental changes. People adapt themselves to changes, but also 
promote changes (Palmer, 1997). People form their own judgments in interaction with other 
agents, being firms or others consumers and citizens.  
This raises the important question of informed preferences. How the provision of information 
impact on the choices made and in addition, how the possibility of interacting with others 
influences the decision-making process and  the final choice ?  
Moreover, in the field of environment and natural resources management, how 
uncommensurable metrics could be accomodated ? Does the opportunity of social interactions 
and learning modify the preferences, and are they differences in the decision-making process 
between consumers and citizens ? 
The development of evaluation workshops, in complementarity with stated preferences 
methods, or the use of citizen jurys, could help in investigating this new area. They face 
difficult issues, but it seems not impossible to find creative solutions. Beyond the academic 
valorisation of the results of our  CBA, are we yet able to use them as input in concrete  
negotiations about projects design and implementation ? 
Land use changes and technological innovations are shaping the landscape changes and have 
certainly a two ways impact on the social preferences for landscape. As they introduce new 
artefacts in the landscape, they produce constrasted evaluations and uses of the emerging 
landscape. The new landscape is confronted to the old, unchanged one, and social forces to 
preserve it are emerging. In the same time, opposition to changes and the heterogeneity of 
preferences are changing the way the changes could be implemented. As a consequence, a 
new acceptable landscape emerges. And so do the new social norms. 
Even if collective norms does exist, they are often characterized by the presence of   
heterogeneity  which make reaching a consensus on a project very difficult. As a 
consequence, some projects  could be delayed or even rejected. Eventually, the pressure for 
landscape changes, arising from the responses to emerging challenges like energy transition, 
food crisis, or population increase,  produce opportunities of renewing old landscape 
preferences, and make the landscape preferences evolve. 
Various exemples could be found in the transport technology and network, the energy, the 
urban growth and the population concentration on the coastal area, the agricultural and 
forestry uses, and so on.  
 
II. Divided ownership and landscape joint production 
 2.1 Multiple actors : property rights issues on landscape 
 
Landscape appears to be a public good. That definition correspond to the market failure 
arising from the co-visibility. Co-visibility makes it difficult for landowners to control the 
access to and the use of the scenic beauty of his land. But it makes also difficult  to identify 
precisely the link between each owner action and the agregate landscape outcome. As a 
consequence, landscape ownership appears to be scattered into a multiplicity of actors of 
various nature (private, communal, statal…). While each could have an impact on the 
characteristic of the landscape, no one is usually able to claim alone the whole ownership on 
the landscape. For that reason, in much countries, State had designed rules to control the 
external effects arising from the exercise of property rights by landowners. If landscape as a 
cultural service and amenities provider would not have social value, the regulators would not 
have developped a bulk of rules in order to control the landscape changes arising from the 
decisions of landowners.  
De facto, use rights and disposal rights, specially when they are related to land, could have 
significant effects on the other’s welfare. For that reason, the property rights have been 
« dismantled » in to a bunch of separate rights, and are constrained by various environmental 
and safety law and regulations.  
At that point, the debate is really a political one, and it’s about the very nature of the 
landownership. The tension is between the conception of property rights (and specially, those 
on land) as an absolute and intangible right of the owner, without any interferences or 
restrictions from any other player, and an instrumental conception, for which the property 
rights are related to some social goals, and should be adapted to the changing goals of the 
Society.  
The various landowners have each different objectives, management criteria and constraints, 
and are not mainly focused on their contribution to the visual aspect of the resulting 
landscape. There are also multiple public policies aimed at sustaining each activity. 
Inevitably, public policies failures arise, and the need for coordination actions aimed at 
landscape maintenance and preservation arise. 
In the context of international negotiation at WTO, the multifunctionality of agriculture has 
been promoted as a main arguments to legitimize public support to agriculture. As a result, a 
vast amount of literature has been produced on the contribution of agriculture to landscape 
maintenance and to the production of landscape  amenities. In such a literature, landscape 
maintenance is analyzed  as a by-product, or a joint production of agricultural activity. As a 
matter of fact, the theory of joint production of landscape by agriculture use the theory of 
production, and avoid to go deeper in the difficult issue of the spatial agregation of actions 
taken by different farmers inside one landscape unit.  
Such an analysis has several flaw and drawbacks. First of all, it’s obvious that agriculture and 
agricultural policy had and could have detrimental effects on the landscape components, 
structure and functions, depending on the region and on the type of production. Land 
abandonment is among the main of them, but one could also account for hedgerows removal, 
wetlands drainage and excessive afforestation.  Even spatially important, agriculture is not the 
only activity contributing to the landscape local character, and moreover, it’s importance in 
the public perceptions could be very diverse.  Finally, public policies failures, due mainly to the lack of coordination among regulatory 
bodies, and to the lack of adequate planing instruments, could turns agri-environmental policy 
in a purely redistributive policy. As a matter of fact, very few efforts are devoted  to integrate 
the territorial and landscape dimensions into the implementation of agri-environmental policy. 
Public subsidies are mainly allocated to farmers without taking onto account the contribution 
of theirs proposed actions to the landscape local characteristics. 
 
 
 2.3 Landscape non point and joint production 
 
The issue of the agregation of actions is in theory closely related to the one of preferences 
heterogeneity and agregation. But, because a specific landscape project could be appreciated 
as beneficial or detrimental by different people,  it’s a methodological necessity to separate 
the stage of evaluation, the stage of decision making and the stage of implementation. Issues 
of coordination of actions arising at the implementation stage should take for granted the 
landscape objectives  and the social value of the project.  
On that basis, it’s useful to introduce the distinction between point changes and non point 
changes.  
Point changes could be managed either trough the use of command and control  instruments 
or bilateral bargaining, because the producer of the externality and those impacted could be 
easily identified. 
Non point changes, arising from the uncoordinated actions of a variety of actors, make the 
organization of the bargaining between those group liable for changes and those impacted by 
the externality more difficult. Even it has been possible to determine the amount of 
compensation to be payed to avoid changes, or the amount of compensation to be payed to 
promote positive changes, it remains difficult to find a way to share the collected amount 
among the landowners or to collect the contribution from them to compensate those affected. 
The main reason for that stems at the higher transaction costs induced by the division of the 
liability for changes, which is an obstacle to the efficient use of negotiation. Dividing 
landscape ownership among a variety of landowner make the Coasian bargaining inefficient.  
But there is another reason, stemming to the difficulty of identifying precisely the 
contribution of each landowner’ actions to the resulting landcape changes. We wonder here if 
the general model of the joint production of public good could be useful or not. We will 
briefly recall the basic models, before going back to the specific case of landscape changes. 
The concept of joint production of a public good relies on three main functional forms. The 
most widely used is the additive one, arising in case of the perfect substituability of actions by 
each contributor. The others two forms are the best-shot (one or few efficient contributions 
are enough to provide almost all the value of the public good, and the weakest link (if only 
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 One could ask wether this very general model is applicable to the landscape provision. To go 
further, it’s necessary to proceeds with some examples. 
Take for instance a project of restauration of an steppic openland  in a context of land 
adandonment and afforestation process (Figures 1, 2, 3). A choice experiment survey has been 
implemented and the outcome give evidence that the prefered landscape is about a low level 
of forested patches at the scale of landscape unit.  Alternatively, one could makes the same 
reasoning if the stated social preference was about forested landscape. 
Due to the existence of perceptual thressholds, it will certainly make no difference for people 
if 4/5 of patches are cleared or all the patches. The difference will be certainly lower in the 
case of a preference for a forested landscape. In that case we could assume that above a 
trasshold of 2/3 forested patches, there will be no diffrence for the visitor. The perceptive 
assymetry induces an asymetry in the functional forms choosen to represent the joint 
production of the desired landscape by landowner. In the case of preference for forested land, 
we could assume a form close to best shot, while in the opposite case, we could assume a 
function closer to the weakest link. In both cases, the convexity-concavity of the landscape 
joint production function is just related to the perception process, and to the perceptive 
asymetry. The landscape preference is related to a very simple attribute, the rate of forested 
patches in the landscape unit. For more complex preferences, some problems could arise due 
to the existence of non-convexity. 
Consider now the case of preferences for a diversified landscape, with a mix of forested 
patches and fields equally scattered in the landscape unit.  The initial conditions could be 
either an openfield or a forested landscape. The whole value of the landscape change should 
be given not only by the global proportion of cultivated fields and forested patches. We need 
to take onto account an additional criterium, which is the degree of fragmentation of each set 
of forest and fields. To translate the preference for a mosaic landscape, we need to take on to 
account the local distribution of forest and fields inside  the neighbourhood of each patch. 
Obviously, the global rate of landowner choosing to afforest their land is not able to fullfill 
the characteristics of the preferences expressed by the public.  We need to introduce an 
additional requirement, that the global rate of forest and field should be also meet locally in 
each local neighbourhood  (Figure 5) . For landowners, the problem become an anti-
coordination game, able to promote local diversity. For the landscape planner, the problem is 
to  introduce an additional argument in the joint production function of the landscape, which 












































Forested land  rate 
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Production Figure 5  : Importance of the spatial arrangements of landscape components  : Three 
landscapes arising from different arrangements of the same proportion of Black and white 
patches 
  
 2.4 Institutional arrangements  and landscape governance 
 
The definition of landscape as  public good, or as an external effects, does not provide by 
itself any solution to the issue of his governance. Moreover, landscape is also a resource for a 
set of actors, and support the local employment. Obviously, landscape has « the element of 
communality ». But the best way to manage that element in a Pareto improving direction is 
not so clear.  
In the case of sites of outstanding or historical value, the regulator issued early rules and 
constraints to limit the exercise of property rights by private landowners in the co-visibility 
area.  In some cases, the taking of the full range of rights could be used. That case is called 
«  eminent domain with compensation  » solution. For ordinary landscapes, zoning is a 
widespread instrument used by public authorities in order to manage external effects arising 
from land developement. Zoning by public authorities does mean that they are acting on 
behalf of the Society as a whole to share the use rights with the landowner. 
Does the local character of the landscape as a public good gives some clues for designing 
institutionnal arrangements to govern landscape changes ? What is the optimal or satisfactory 
level of authority to manage landscape ? Traditionally, the answers to that question depends 
on the importance of the spill-over between juridictions and the extent of external effects. But 
as soon as we are taking an political economics view of the problem, we know that the local 
elected authority  should be protected from the pressure of individual interests. 
As a consequence,  State as a legal entity is entitled with a part of the property rights attached 
to land, and should be considered as a co-owner of its own right. Nevertheless, the precise 
conditions under which this rights sharing could be organized  remains under scrutiny. When 
some  stakeholders only have vested interest in the landscape management, one could invokes 
the doctrine of public trust, where individual people could stand in the trust to defends their 
interest against landowners (Brewer and al., 2009).  
Instruments like marketable development rights are seen as substitute to zoning and command 
and control instruments (CC). But are the markets instruments able to manage landscape 
changes and to accomodate the diversity of landscape preferences ? 
 
 
III.   Landscape Policy : opportunities and challenges 
 
Lanscape policy could be aimed at preserving, conserving or promoting landscape with a 
specific features. Command and control instruments are  the most efficient for preserving 
landscape, but they face the opposition of the supporters of the absolute conception of 
property rights. For that reason, incentives and markets instruments are complementary to CC 
instruments, but they also face specific challenges when the regulator is willing to use them to 
cope with landscape issues. Challenges arise from the necessity to integrate topology and 
spatial arrangements of artefacts and other landscape components as additional dimension in 
the incentives’ design.  
 
3.1 Landscape Policy Instruments : how to take onto account topology ? 
As we have seen before, the main characteristic of landscape perception is the importance of 
topology. The identification of landscape components and their spatial arrangements matters 
in evaluation, not only the level of each components. Compacity or fragmentation, connectivity are fundamental variables in the landscape perceptions. As a consequences, 
when designing policy instruments, it’s necessary to add some more constraints to fully 
accomodate that specific properties.  I would just mention here the case of incentives able to 
promote agglomeration of patches having the same land uses or characteristic, and the case of 
incentives to promote diversity in the neighbourhood. 
Agglomeration bonus is a  simple incentive device, proposed by Parkhurst and Shogren 
(Parkhurst, 2002). The incentive is made of two part, one which is a lump sum payment 
related to a land use change desired by the community, the other one which is conditional to 
the proposed plot being contiguous to another with the same land use, the owner being the 
same or not. Because the strategic equilibria arising from that design are multiple, its 
necessary to explore experimentally or by local negotiation the potential outcome. It’s worth 
to compare the agglomeration bonus system with one we proposed, an coupled incentives 
scheme, designed in order to reach an environmental target and to spare public funds 
(Krawczyck, 2002). This second one is not able, by his own design,  to get any  spatially 
explicit outcome. 
Landscape ecologists given evidence of the importance of landscape heterogeneity for 
enchancing both productivity and biodiversity. Then, beside compacity, the land planner 
could wish to promote  diversity of land uses inside a specific area or neighbourhood. The 
problem is analogous to the production of gloves , or socks, where the factory need to produce 
simultaneously right and left handside (foot). It’s known as an anti-coordination game. When 
agents are interacting in a set of fixed partners, the analysis shows that network effects are 
much stronger than when partners play a coordination game (Bramoulle, 2003). At the 
landscape scale, the equivalent of the social network is made from the neighbourhood 
structure. Several solutions could be proposed at the landscape scale, from collective rotations  
(fallow and fields) to the allocation of production rights or quotas. 
 
3.3 Public policies  implementation : time consistency issues 
The implementation of landscape  policies face time consistency issues. They are  arising 
from the discrepancy between the  evolution of  individual preferences and collective norms 
compared to the evolution of landscape itself. Landscape preferences are changing : some 
objective could be accepted or dominant at a given point in time, and rejected some decades 
after. But the socio-ecological process of landscape changes has his own viscosity, and it’s  
impossible to immediately streamline the new social norms with the current state of the 
landscape. Moreover, the  landscape norms, specially those aimed at conserving historically 
dated landscape, could  face difficulties due to the impossibility to restaure the economical 
and social conditions prevalents at the time of reference (Van Haaren, 2007)  
Some time, ecological processes interact with social processes and public policies 
implementation in a way of anhilating them.  
To cope with this type difficulty, often met in epidemic process, Bradley has recently 
proposed the concept of chronotone. By analogy with the concept of ecotone, widely used in 
ecology, he proposes to use chronotone to describe the specific phase in the process of man-
made environmental change (Bradley, ). 
As ecotone is a bound  ary  in  space  between  two ecosystems or habitats in which many 
complex process are at work, there are analogous boudaries in time between the two 
ecosystems or landscape phases. More precisely, ecotone is « the period of relatively rapid 
transformation separating the two long-term types of land use . It may last from months to 
over a decade for epidemiologically important habitat changes »  
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We take here the case study of public policies aimed at fighting the consequences of land 
abandonment and preserving the openess of landscape in the Great Causses area, South of 
Massif Central (France) (Lifran, 2009). Just after the second world war, the policy context 
was about to leave the area to the natural afforestation process and to harvest wood. An aided 
afforestation policy has even been promoted to accelerate the conversion.  But around the  
1980, the growing awareness of the negative external effects of afforestation and the desire to 
keep the landscape open motivated the design of a new policy aimed at fighting  enroachment 
and preserving grassland. A huge amount of public funds has been devoted during two 
decades to that policy. But the impact on the landscape dynamics has been very low, except in 
some places with a agricultural community facing land constraints. As a matter of fact, the 
ecological process of enroachment is based on the long distance diffusion of pine’s seeds. The 
human process of land abandonment is based on susbstitution of imported resources to the 
locally exploited, and also on the disparition of some old practices like long term fallow. 
When the global society becomes aware of the negative external effect of land abandonment, 
and is willing to pay for restauring open landscape, it’s to late to go back at a bearable cost. 
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The Balinese Paradox, among others, enlights another difficulty (Lorenzen, 2005)  . Rice 
fields terrace in Bali are among the most beautiful features and components of the tourism 
attractiviness of the Island. This agricultural system is very complex, and efficient, due to a 
very integrated management of water and cropping agendas. It needs a very high investment 
in labor to maintain his efficiency. Due to the boom in the tourism industry, people leave the 
rice fields, but also all the water infrastructure maintenance, for more profitable and amenable 
jobs. As a consequence, the attractiveness of the landscape erodes and could constitutes soon 
a threat to landscape quality and as a consequence, for the tourism. The same holds in the 
Philippines Islands, where the rice terraces have been promoted as World Heritage Landscape 
 
 
IV.   Conclusions and perspectives 
 
In that paper,  I voluntarily choose to concentrate my investigation on few topics. That does 
not means that I consider remaining topics as secondary. On the contrary, I choose to leave 
aside the question of the landscape formation and the main drivers of the landscape changes. 
The topic is difficult enough to devote much time than few minutes to it. Moreover, it’s 
overlapping in a large extent with spatial and economic geography, and its important to take 
care for identifying the specific point related to landscape economics to be developped.  
Among the most important and original factors of interest for landscape economics, I would 
mention the role of property rights, as the enforcement of property rights creates artefacts or 
reinforces natural components, which are important components of the landscape perception 
(stonewalls, hedgerows, fences…).  Settlements are organized to a large extent as a response 
to social interactions regulated by property rights. In addition of the landscape making up , 
properties rights forms the basis of what we called the « viscosity forces ».  Viscosity forces 
contribute to the landscape dynamics together with agglomerating and dispersing forces 
(Lifran and al., 2007). They are related to the high  transaction costs of changing the spatial 
organization of enforcement devices.  
Global trend and new stakes in economy, (demographic increase and urban sprawl, energy 
transition, infrastructures renewing), subsummed by the term «  economic development  », 
promote new landscape artefacts and networks, and constitute the main drivers of landscape 
changes together with changes in preferences. 
Take for instance the case of carbon  markets. What will happen if agriculture is accepted  to 
take part to them on the supply side ? Would some farmers decide to go back from cereal to 
grassland, or to afforest their land instead ? What could be a landscape emerging from the 
trade-off between conventional agriculture, bio-fuel, carbon, photo-voltaic and wind power, 
and recreational markets ?  What could be for instance a carbon-neutral landscape ?  And does 
that question make sense ? How the allocation of land to various uses could accommodates 
the balance between Carbon sources and sinks ? Is it about the balance between forest and 
agriculture, or between the allocation of land to food and to renewable energy production ?  
Eventually, how to adress the question of the balance between the technological choices and 
the landscape preferences ?   
Hodge characterized the emergent situation as a « disintegration of interests in landscape » 
and suggested that multiple stakes could reinforce the stewardship dimension in the 
landownership. That could occurs because their are certainly a lot of difficuties in keeping the 
management of differents components of landscape involved in differents functions perfectly 
separable. How to take onto account the impact of those technology shift on landscape 
governance ?  The disintegration of interests among several markets, calls certainly for an increasing role of 
the landscape as mediating construct.  Because his dobble nature of public good and common 
pool resource, the landscape could be certainly a good « go between » to reunite fragmented 
functions and interests, integrating them in the local or regional project of development. The 
local project approach has the advantage of disentangling the balance of interests and costs 
from the present day and to move it to a longer horizon. In addition, it is acting as a 
coordination of anticipation device, which is able to change the individual and social balance 
of the costs and benefits of the changes. This intuition should be investigated and explored 
both at the theoretical and empirical level. But the challenges ahead call for investing 
resources in the issue.  
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